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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
TISCO INTERMOUNTAIN and
STATE INSURANCE FUND,

:
:

Plaintiffs,
vs.

:
:
:

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH and
JEAN B. WERNER, widow of
GEORGE B. WERNER, deceased,

:
:
:
!

Defendants.

Supreme Court No. 20913

:

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did the Industrial Commission act without or

in excessf of its authority in awarding death benefits under
the

Utah

Occupational

Disease

Disability

Lawf

Utah

Code

Ann./ Sections 35-2-1 to Section 35-2-65 because of a lack
of

credible

evidence

of

exposure

to asbestos during

the

deceased employee's last employment by the plaintiff?
2.
deceased

Assuming some exposure to asbestos during the

employee's last employment by plaintifff was such

employment

the last

injurious

such disease?

-1-

exposure

to the hazards of

3.
Section

Are

35-2-14

the

provisions

unconstitutional

of

Section

under

the

35-2-13

provisions

and
of

Article 1, Section XI and Article XVI, Section 5 of the Utah
Constitution in that the defendant is denied a forum to hear
her claim because

the foregoing

statutes

of repose limit

claims to deaths occurring within three years from the last
day upon which the employee actually worked for the employer
against whom compensation is claimed and which exposure was
injurious or harmful?

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant

agrees

with

plaintiffs1

statement

of

facts insofar as it is supported by the record of this case.
In addition

to plaintiffs1

statement defendants would add

the following:
Mrs. Werner testified that as an officer of Tisco
she had

limited

after 1977.

knowledge

of

the products

used

by Tisco

It was not the kind used previously but had

been outlawed, more or less

(R. 29).

answer to the question, "Would

Witness Collins in

it be fair to say there's

still some asbestos based material still being used in the
industry?" answered, "I'd have to say yes to that question"
(R. 50).

Witness Collins also testified that transite pipe

is still being used, transite sheets are still being used
which

are

heavily

based

in

asbestos

(R.

51).

Witness

Collins further testified that because transite was commonly
used in the trade the deceased must have used it (R. 52).
-2-

Witness Kinder testified that after the ban in 1970 or 1971
that his use and the deceased's use decreased but that "you
still could encounter the type of dustf although it would
not contain asbestos fibers that you've described as occurring in fabrication shops after the ban on asbestos1'(R. 74).
The only significant portion of the offer of proof relates
to McOmie alleging that "Tisco has performed demolition type
work on existing insulated facilities and piping systems and
would constitute less than 1 per cent of the company's total
volume" (R. 78).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.
sion

of

Defendant contends that the Industrial Commis-

Utah properly

awarded

occupational disease death

benefits with some credible evidence of exposure to asbestos
during the deceased employee's period of employment with the
employer

against whom

the award

was made.

Plaintiff has

used only the offer of proof as evidence of some exposure
after

1977.

Witness Kinder, who worked with and for de-

ceased , testified that both he and the deceased were exposed
in

fact

after

the

ban

and

that such

exposure was of a

reduced amount over the exposure in fabrication shops.
2.

Assuming facts that would support a finding of

exposure to asbestos fibers, the law imposing liability on
the

last employer

for whom

-3-

the deceased was "injuriously

exposed

to the hazards of

impossible

to achieve.

Because

peritoneal mesothelioma
nearly

20, the

last.

first

the disease" would

being

clearly be

of the latency factor in

at least 15 years and more

exposure

is the deadliest—not

the

All other cases of occupational disease, i.e., sili-

cosis, silico-tuberculosis, lung cancer caused by ionizing
radiation, coal worker's pneumoconiosis, to name a few, are
based

upon

a presumption

that

exposure

is cumulative and

that the last exposure is the most harmful.

The deceased's

death warrant was in effect signed 15 to 20 years prior to
his death.
3.
tional

on

Sections 35-2-13 and 35-2-14 are unconstitu-

the

grounds

that

these

sections

deny

to

the

defendant an opportunity to be heard on a clearly compensible claim whose exposure was rooted in history—at least 15
years

prior—and

35-2-14

is

a

was

statute

the

sole

cause

of

repose.

of

death.

Section

The statute of repose

(35-2-14) runs 30 days after "...the employee was last injuriously

exposed

to

the

hazards

of

such

disease."

All

medical authorities agree that peritoneal mesothelioma has a
latency period of at least 15 years.

Therefore, the last

injurious exposure occurred in 1967 that ultimately led to
the death

of

the

deceased.

Section

35-2-13

U.C.A.

1953

requires "the death must occur within three years from the
last day upon which the employee actually worked

for the

employer

Section

against

whom

compensation

-4-

is claimed."

35-2-14 U.C.A. 1953 provides "the only employer liable shall
be the employer in whose employment the employee was last
injuriously
Section

exposed

to

the

35-2-48(c) provides

hazards

of

such

disease."

a dependent's cause of action

shall be deemed to arise when the dependent knew the death
was the result of an occupational disease.

The dependents

here knew the death was occupationally related in 1983 and
filed a claim promptly against the last employer—plaintiff
herein.

The impossibility of filing against the real respon-

sible party back in 19 67 is apparent.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THERE
WAS
EVIDENCE
OF EXPOSURE TO
ASBESTOS DURING THE DECEASED EMPLOYEE'S
LAST PERIOD OF EMPLOYMENT WITH THE
EMPLOYER AGAINST WHOM THE AWARD WAS
MADE.
Section 35-2-14 provides the basis upon which the
liability is chargeable to the last employer by providing in
part:
"...the only employer liable shall be the
employer in whose employment the employee was
last injuriously exposed to the hazards of such
disease." (Underscoring added.)
Plaintiffs argue there was no evidence of record
and that the Commission relied solely on the offer of proof.
Such is not the case.

-5-

Quoting

directly

from

the Denial

of Motion For

Review:
"In 1971, the Federal Government banned the
use of asbestos in insulation products. Based on
testimony adduced at the hearing, the administrative law judge found that the Federal Government
ban did not necessarily preclude the continued use
of asbestos products. After the ban, in 1977, the
deceased formed his own insulation company known
as Tisco Intermountain" (R. 178).
All of the witnesses including the widow, Joseph
Collins and Darrell Kinder testified in accordance with the
above.

The only additional evidence was suggested

in the

offer of proof that McOmie would testify as to demolition
work in 1981 and 1982 (R. 78). The Commission did not rely
only on the offer of proof of McOmie, the Commission relied
on an overall appraisal of the testimony when it found:
"We find there was sufficient factual testimony to support a finding that the deceased experienced 'some exposure1 to asbestos while employed
with TISCO" (R. 180).
Even

in dissent Commissioner

"...the evidence

Hadley

opined

that

is too speculative on the issue of last

injurious exposure, and therefore, the claim must be denied"
(R. 180).

Commissioner

Hadley does not make clear as to

whether the speculative nature of the evidence is directed
at "injurious" or "some exposure".
It

is

respectfully

submitted

that

even

medical

authorities are unsure of an acceptable level of asbestos as
not being harmful.

The medical community and the Federal

-6-

Government by virtue of the ban on the use of any asbestos
product would presume that "any exposure" is injurious and
"harmful".

POINT II.
ASSUMING THERE WAS EXPOSURE TO ASBESTOS
DURING THE DECEASED EMPLOYEE'S EMPLOYMENT WITH HIS EMPLOYER, BENEFITS WERE
PROPERLY AWARDED BECAUSE THERE IS NO
ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF ASBESTOS EXPOSURE
THAT IS NOT INJURIOUS.
In

the

Occupational

forty-five

Disease

year

Disability

existence
Law"

of

the

Sections

"Utah

35-2-1

to

35-2-65, U.C.A. 1953, this Supreme Court has addressed opinions on this subject less than twenty times.

Not one of

those opinions has been directed at the terms "harmful," or
"injurious exposure to the hazards of employment."

With two

exceptions all cases are more than 20 years old.
Section
defines:

35-2-12

"disablement,"

"total disability,"

or

"award,"

"Commission"

Section

35-2-28

"silicosis".

U.C.A.

1953

very

"disability,"

carefully

"disabled,"

and

"totally disabled," "compensation,"
and

U.C.A.

"partial
1953

permanent disability".

defines

very

specifically

Nowhere in those sections are there any sugges-

tions as to what "harmful" or "injurious exposure" means.
By far the greatest majority of the cases considered by this Court has involved "silicosis" or "silico tuberculosis"

based

upon disability or death.

-7-

The legislative

history of the statute—passed in 1941—was designed principally for the benefit of the silicotic miner.

Presumably

this is why the overwhelming majority of cases involves this
subject.
In

all

of

those

cases

the

issue of

"injurious

exposure" or "prolonged inhalation of silicon dioxide dust"
was never raised.
The industrial commission seemed to work on a presumption that if the employee worked in a "hardrock mine" it
was presumed to have silicon dioxide dust and that the same
was harmful.
ity

on

Many years ago a local leading medical author-

silicosis

testified

that

the

mere

presence

of

"silicosis" was sufficient to show the injurious nature of
the exposure.
Beginning with Masich v. United States Smelting,
Refining and Mining Co., 113 U 101, 191 P2d 612, this court
has held that the act (Utah Occupational Disease Disability
Law) occupies

the complete field of silicosis both as to

partial as well as total disability.
intended all occupational diseases.

Presumably, the court
Naturally the defendant

is limited to the benefits of this law.
In Kennecott Copper Corp. (Utah Copper Div.) v.
Ind. Comm., 115 U 451, 205 P2d 829, the Supreme Court held
that the law is premised on the concept that if an employee
is accepted into an employment and performs his work successfully for a number of years, and while in such employment

-8-

finally becomes totally disabled from silicosis, employer in
whose employment disability occurs should not be permitted
to exempt

himself

from

liability

for total disability by

asserting that silicosis arose in some prior employment.
In Uta-Carbon Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission/
104 U 567, 140 P2d 649, applying subd. (a)(3) of Section
35-2-13 U.C.A. 1953, the Supreme Court, after referring to
the fact that the legislature had not defined what are harmful

quantities

of

silicon

dioxide

dust,

found

it

was

apparent that applicant was exposed to harmful quantities of
such dust in the employ of the company for a period of sixty
days after effective date of this Act.
"coal miner" engaged

in spreading

The case involved a

"rock dust" in a coal

mine.
In Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Industrial
Commission, 108 U 123, 157 P2d 800, this court ruled that a
successor carrier was liable even though the disabled miner
neither had silicosis nor later tuberculosis where it was
still on the risk when employee was last exposed to harmful
quantities of silicon dioxide dust.
All of the foregoing cases simply presume exposure
and its harmful nature because the employee in fact has silicosis

or

silico-tuberculosis.

At

no time was

the issue

raised that the last sixty days were not injurious because
the miner already had the disease.

-9-

The

medical

community

and

the

public

health

officials were not aware of peritoneal mesothelioma and its
relationship to asbestos fibers until the 1960fs.

Because

of the relationship asbestos had with the development of all
forms of cancer the federal government banned

its further

manufacture and use in 1971 or 197 2,
It would be important to quote directly from the
addendum to the Medical Panel Report of Doctor Lockeyf the
Medical
entitled

Panel Chairman.

The quote is taken from a paper

"Asbestos—Effects

on

Health

of

Exposure

Asbestos" by Richard Doll and Julian Peto:
"As
with
other
environmentally
induced
cancers, the mean period from first exposure to
the appearance of the disease is unrelated to the
intensity of exposure, except insofar as heavy
exposures shorten the expectation of life and consequently the time during which cancers can occur.
We cannot, therefore, aim to reduce exposure to
such an extent that the individual will inevitably
die of something else before the disease is able
to appear. Unless, unexpectedly, there turns out
to be some threshold dose below which asbestos
does not act as a carcinogen, all we can hope to
do is reduce the attributable risk at each
interval after first exposure to such a level that
the balance of the risk and benefit associated
with its use is socially acceptable. (Underscoring added.)
As with lung cancer (and with other cancers
due to other causes) increasing exposure increases
the risk of developing the disease, but does not
affect the length of the induction period. (Underscoring added.)
A progressive reduction in mesothelioma risk
as a duration of exposure is reduced has also been
demonstrated in other studies (e.g. Newhouse and
Berry, 1976; Hobbs et. al. 1980) and this
-10-

to

observation deserves special emphasis. For it is
still widely believed, in spite of consistent
evidence to the contrary, that very brief asbestos
exposure necessarily causes a substantial risk of
mesothelioma" (R. 158).
The medical

authorities

above

seem

to

indicate

that the initial exposure of 15 to 20 years prior is the precursor
this

of the later developing

theory

the

latency

mesothelioma.

period

or

As part of

the time required

to

develop a full-blown cancer is 15 years. Continued exposure
or the intensity of the exposure has little effect on the
necessary

latency

consideration

period.

However,

an

is the removal entirely

equally

important

of any exposure to

asbestos.
It
Section

must

35-2-14,

be

pointed

supra,

out

provides

that

the

language

"...employer

in

of

whose

employment the employee was last injuriously exposed to the
hazards of such disease."

It is arguable that a fair inter-

pretation of this section in the instant case would be that
any exposure of asbestos fiber to the deceased or any other
employee

would

be

injurious

and

a hazard

potentially

creating a mesothelioma 15 years hence.
The Medical Panel found:
"Pleural or peritoneal mesotheliomas
are
extremely rare disorders and have been highly
associated with occupational or other unusual
exposures to asbestos...
Increasing intensity of exposure to asbestos
fibers increases the risk of developing the disease but does not affect the length of incubation
period.. .

-11-

in

It would appear that continuous exposure
greater than 20 years would not increase the
risk of the development of a malignant mesothelioma but a reduction in duration of exposure
has been associated with progressive reduction
of mesothelioma risk. In theory, a cessation of
exposure in 1968 may have decreased the risk for
his development of the malignant mesothelioma."
Is it not, therefore, arguable that the reduced
exposure after 1968 may not have been the "main cause" but
had

the exposures

seems

to say

been

reduced

"the reduction

or eliminated, the doctor

in duration

of exposure has

been associated with progressive reduction of mesothelioma
risk."
The subsequent exposure may well have had nothing
to do with the initiation of the cancer in 19 67 but it may
well have had something to do with the ultimate creation of
the fatal lesion in 1983.
The plaintiff and the commission have quoted from
Professor

Larson

as a source

in the absence of a court

decision.
Defendant would also quote from Professor Larson
but from the larger work.
At

Section

41.80

Special

Occupational

Disease

Restrictions Professor Larson writes:
"In most states the benefits for occupational
disease, and the conditions controlling compensability are the same as for other kinds of disability. However, in spite of a trend toward abolition of special restrictions in recent years,
there remain a significant number of states in
which special provisions affecting occupational
diseases, and especially dust diseases, have survived
and must be reckoned with."
-12-

Later at Section 41.81 Professor Larson writes:
"S 41.81
The original reason for these
restrictions was the fear that the compensation
system could not bear the financial impact of full
liability for dust diseases since they were so
widespread in the industries...some states met
this transition problem (which to some extent may
be thought of as a temorary one...) by introducing
a sliding scale of silicosis benefits which would
reach full size in a number of years, by barring
benefits for partial disability, and by throwing
up a variety of barriers based on relation of time
or degree of exposure to time of disability, death
or claim.
What happened, however, was that these makeshifts, contrived to tide employers and carriers
over a transitional difficulty, remained ingrained
in compensation acts long after their reason for
existence had diminished or disappeared.
S.
41.82
Requirements
related
to time
between exposure and disability or death, minimum
period of injurious exposure and the like.
One of the commonest types of restrictive
provisions is that which bars claims unless the
disability or death occurred within a specified
number of years after a specified event, such as
the last day of work for the particular employer
or the last injurious exposure. The arbitrariness
of these statutes and their exceptions has produced all kinds of senseless discrimination.
It is often difficult to understand what some
of
these
restrictive
provisions were really
driving at."
Professor

Larson

then

quotes

from

the

Utah

Statutes Section 35-2-13 saying "...the two year limitation
in death cases is replaced by a five-year period if death
resulted from continuous total disability for which compensation has been paid or awarded.

In one case

(Pac. States

Cast Iron Pipe v. Industrial Commission, supra) death benefits were denied the widow because, although the employee
had actually applied for compensation during his lifetime,
-13-

the Commission had never got around to passing on his claim
before his death.

It was conceded that the claim would have

been granted, but because of non-action beyond the control
of either the employee or his widow, the literal terms of
the statute were not fulfilled."
Note that we are discussing silicosis and in the
years

past

strict

interpretation

of

the

rules

has

been

followed presumably to protect the interests of the employer.

The restrictions and limitations within the statute in

Utah were designed for that purpose.
Of course defendant prefers the second paragraph
of Prof. Larson, Section 95.26

(a):

"...As long as there

was some exposure of a kind which could have caused the disease, the last insurer at risk is liable for all the disablity from that disease."
In the case of silicosis, I believe that is the
current interpretation by the commission and this court.

In

35 years experience in this business I have yet to hear the
defense
quoted

of

the

"injurious

court decisions

nature of the exposure."

All

and commission decisions imply the

same rationale, that some exposure is injurious exposure.
Professor Larson refers to the restrictive limitations on exposure as a protection to the employer.

There is

no

and

real

relationship

between

these

restrictions

possible benefit to the rights of the employee.

-14-

the

Defendants

agree completely

that

there is no rationale for the term

"injurious exposure".
Plaintiffs quote with approval the Scott Company
v. Workers1

Compensation

Appeals Board, 139 Cal. App. 3d

98f 188 Cal. Rptr. 537 (1983).
nature of the claim.

Plaintiff fails to note the

The California Workers Compensation

Law provides that the Claimant is entitled to benefits from
all employers who have contributed

to his problem.

Prop-

erly the court ruled that the claimant was entitled to benefits but the liability could be imposed only on firms which
actually

contributed

employee

was

not

to

the

denied

employees

benefits.

in some way.

The

dispute

The

existed

between the employers as to how much each should contribute.
Unfortunately Utah law is such that there is no
contribution from prior exposures.
only

employer

employer.

There

liable
can

under
be

no

As a matter of fact the

Utah

law

contribution

is
or

the

last

claim

made

against prior employers because of the various statutes of
limitation and statutes of repose preventing access to the
previous employers.
The experience of the State Insurance Fund and the
private insurance companies in losses connected with Occupational Disease has been so minimal that for many, many years
a

separate premium

is not assessed

for this coverage.

review of the occupational disease claims
Court bears

this out.

A

in the Supreme

There have been fewer than twenty

-15-

appeals in the past forty-five years and no case of significance before this court involving either death or total disability in the past twenty years.
Here

we

have

a case of admitted

death benefits from an occupational disease*

liability

for

George Werner

died, solely because he ingested asbestos fibers in connection with his employment, and was continuously
some asbestos fibers until his death.
the

nicety

that

the

deceased

did

exposed to

Plaintiffs defend on
not

have

"injurious

exposure" of at least thirty days while operating his own
insulation business.

It is respectfully submitted that this

is in fact a true case to be charged against the insulation
industry,

the

asbestos

industry

and

industry

generally.

They are responsible for George Werner's death.

POINT III.
SECTION 35-2-13 AND SECTION 35-2-14 ARE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON THE GROUNDS THAT
THESE SECTIONS DENY DEFENDANT ACCESS TO
A FORUM TO HEAR AND DETERMINE HER RIGHTS
GUARANTEED
UNDER
THE
PROVISIONS
OF
ARTICLE I, SECTION II AND ARTICLE XVI,
SECTION V, OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
STATE OF UTAH.
If the court were to assume the position of the
plaintiffs herein that the last injurious exposure by the
deceased

was 1967, then

the deceased

employee would have

been required to file a claim no later than 1970—this being
three years after the last exposure.

In effect the employer

at that time would be relieved of all liability.
-16-

No cause of action arose under our statutes until
1983,

Under the provisions of Section 35-2-48, U.C.A. 1953,

the dependent's cause of action arose when she knew that the
death was the result of an occupational disease.
Section
tion.

35-2-48, supra, is a statute of limita-

Section 35-2-14, supra, would appear to be a statute

of repose.

It provides in part "...the only employer liable

shall be the employer in whose employment the employee was
last injuriously exposed to the hazards of such disease."
Interpreted

strictly

this

relieves Tisco because

the exposure was not injurious and the exposure must go back
to the last "injurious exposure."

Plaintiff's interpreta-

tion would move the last injurious exposure to 1967, when
the

mesothelioma

began

to

develop.

Since

the

deceased

neither knew that he was "injuriously exposed" nor in fact
could have been diagnosed as having mesothelioma, he filed
no claim.

The insidious part about this grievous medical

problem is that it cannot be diagnosed until it is terminal
or fatal.
By virtue of a strict application of these restrictive

employer-oriented

cases, the widow

statutory

is denied

defenses

the opportunity

in

silicosis

to assert an

Occupational Disease claim.
The Supreme Court's recent decision on Mark Berry
et. al. v. Beech Aircraft Corp. et. al., 25 Utah Adv. Rep.
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30, No. 17694, has a significant bearing on the issues in
this case.
The court said:
"Statutes of repose, such as Section 3 of the
Products Liability Act are different from statutes
of limitations, although to some extent they serve
the same ends...
Once a cause of action arises, a statute of
limitations requires a lawsuit to be filed within
a specified period of time after the injury or the
remedy for the wrong committed is deemed waived.
A statute of repose bars all actions after the
statutory period of time has elapsed. The repose
period, however, begins to run from the occurrence
of some event other than the occurrence of the
injury that gives rise to the cause of action.
Since the statute of repose begins to run
from a date unrelated to the date of an injury, it
is not therefore designed to allow a reasonable
term for the filing of an action once it arises.
Thus, a statute of repose may bar the filing of a
lawsuit even though the cause of action did not
even arise until after it was barred...Thus
Section 3 of the Utah Product Liability Act bars
actions without regard to when an injury occurs
and is not designed to provide a reasonable time
within which to file a lawsuit. Indeed, a statute
of repose may cut off a cause of action even
though it is filed within the period allowed by
the relevant statute of limitations."
Applied to the instant case, it appears that the
last injurious exposure provision is clearly intended as a
statute of repose.
harmful and

Here, admittedly, the last injurious,

sole contributing cause for the death of the

deceased occurred in 1967.

The statute of limitations would

run in three years or 1970. But the cause of action arose in
1983 at the death of George Werner.
The court said further in Berry:
-18-

"Indeed, long delayed health hazards from
prescription drugs such as DES (which may cause
cancer in the daughters of patients who have taken
that drug) , and chemicals such as asbestos and
vinyl chloride can cause death many years after
exposure. See e.g., Mathis v. Ely Lily and Co.,
719 F2d 134 (6th Circuit 1983).
(Plaintiff sued
for damages for cervical cancer which developed in
1980 apparently from mothers ingestion of DES in
1955); Karjala v. Johns Manville Products Corp.,
523 F2d 155 (8th Cir. 1975) (asbestos dust)."
Article I, Section II, provides:
"All courts shall be open, and every person,
for an injury done him in his person, property, or
reputation shall have a remedy by due course of
law, which shall be administered without denial or
unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred
from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal
in this state, by himself or counsel any civil
course to which he is a party."
This

court

also

in

the Berry

(supra) case, in

reference to this provision, writes':
"Defining the scope of the constitutional
protection that Section II affords individual
substantive rights is a task of the utmost delicacy and requires a careful consideration of other
important, and sometimes competing, constitutional
interests.
"Article XVI, Section V: Wrongful Death."
"The right of action to recover damages for
injuries resulting in death, shall never be abrogated, and the amount recoverable shall not be
subject to any statutory limitation, except in
cases where compensation for injuries resulting in
death is provided for by law."
Article XVI, Section V, was amended in 19 20 to add
the last phrase providing
benefits.

for workers1 compensation death

By virtue of this Amendment the workers' compensa-

tion laws have been deemed constitutional.
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In the instant case, with the law in effect that
the "last injurious exposure to the hazards of employment"
occurred
cause

of

in 1967, this claim would
action arose,

be denied

(Underscoring

added.)

before the
The widow

would be denied death benefits under the Occupational Disease Disability Law and would be prevented from a wrongful
death suit because of the exclusive remedy provision under
Section 35-2-3.
The

employer

provided

not

only

the

dangerous

material but also provided the hazardous environment worked
in by the deceased.

Truly, the real responsible party is

held immune from suit or claim and the widow is denied benefits to which she is properly entitled.
Professor

Larson,

Workmens

Compensation

Law

at

Section 41.81 discussed the problem of special occupational
disease

restrictions

as

it

applied

to the Michigan

Michigan's law was very restrictive at the outset.

law.

As time

went by the need for such restrictions became not only less
apparent but virtually nil.

Professor Larson writes:

"The persistence of this unsatisfactory situation led to a dramatic attempt in Michigan to have
the special statutory limits on silicosis benefits
struck down as unconstitutional. The essence of
the claimant1s argument—a theory with fascinating
implications for constitutional law in general—
was that a statute which might have been constitutional when passed could become unconstitutional
by the disappearance of the conditions whose existence had made the original enactment constitutional... The claimant argued that the maximum
limit of $6,000 for silicotic disability created
an arbitrary, unreasonable
and discriminatory
classification under the 14th Amendment
The
-20-

court, although sympathetic toward the claim, held
that it was beyond the power of the court to apply
this reasoning to the instant case because at the
time the decedent1s rights accrued the classification was not obsolete. It is interesting that the
court apparently did not rule out the possibility
of reconsidering this line of attack in some
future case in which the evidence would be
stronger on obsolescence.
The Supreme Court of
Michigan said:
"Any argument that the scheme is now
obsolete as to future disabilities must
wait consideration on a record which
presents some facts from which it might
be deducted that the legislative reasoning had lost all value with the passage
of time and change of circumstances.
(104 N.W. 2d 182 at p. 188)•"
It

is

respectfully

submitted

that

the

phrase

"...last injuriously exposed to the hazards of such disease"
is obsolete and wholly discriminatory in the light of modern
day

medical

technology

and

its ability

to determine the

original causes of occupational diseases and disability.

CONCLUSION
Using
"some"

the

exposure

and

industrial
applying

commission's
the

same

to

findings
the

of

long-

established practice of considering any exposure as sufficient

to meet

the qualifications

of Sections 35-2-4, the

Award of the Industrial Commission should be sustained.
Alternatively, out of consideration of the constitutional enigma presented by Section 35-2-4, the same should
be struck down as obsolete and unconstitutional in denying
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this Defendant an opportunity to have her rights determined
for death benefits,
DATED this

day of February, 1986.

ROBERT J. SHAUGHNESSY,
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